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NIST Finalizes Post-Quantum Cryptography Guidance, GAO Offers a Reality Check

The emerging technology will soon break the “lock and key” encryption currently protecting sensitive data. A new GAO report shows agencies are behind on building their defenses.

A nation-state actor breaches a network to steal medical records, classified government communications, or trade secrets, knowing full well it’s encrypted and unreadable. But they don’t consider inaccessibility a failure — that was actually the plan all along.

Attackers are banking on the advent of quantum computing to decode and exploit all that stolen data, now secured with traditional public- and private-key encryption. The federal government has set standards to help prepare now, but a new report warns that agencies are still not even close to implementing those defenses.

“Harvest now, decrypt later” (HNDL), a term coined over a decade ago, refers to attackers sitting on stolen data and waiting for quantum computing to catch up. Once they’re equipped to decrypt it, they may sell it on the Dark Web, use it in extortion threats, or exploit it for espionage purposes. That time is closer than it appears.

Threat actors are getting ready, but US federal agencies are lagging. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laid out a technical road map to guide organizations through the process in its recent “Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards” report. Technology providers, standards organizations, and infrastructure operations on which federal systems depend are also required to meet the report’s deadlines.

The deadlines to implement measures to mitigate quantum risks are set for Dec. 31, 2030, but a report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) cautions that federal agencies are not prepared to meet them.

Preventing Future Breaches

When quantum computing does take off, it will suddenly render the encryption organizations rely on today insecure. Its computing power will enable attackers to brute-force encryption keys commonly used to protect sensitive data across sectors. The technology is still out of reach for most organizations due to high costs and talent shortages, but progress toward mainstreaming it is accelerating.

NIST says preparations must begin now, even “before a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer has been built,” labeling it a “pressing threat” because of threat actors’ ability to harvest data now and decrypt it later.

Some executive order and memorandum deadlines for federal agencies, such as completing cryptographic inventories and designating a dedicated post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration lead, have already passed. But a big one remains: By December 2030, agencies are expected to implement migrations that mitigate as much quantum risk as possible.

NIST urges organizations to “treat the migration to PQC as a current operational priority.” But conducting cryptographic inventories, planning migration, and early deployments of PQC-enabled products and services may be difficult for a sector that already struggles with cybersecurity, largely due to legacy systems.

“Since sensitive data often retains its value for many years, starting the transition to post-quantum cryptography now is critical to preventing these future breaches,” NIST states in the report.

GAO Says Federal Agencies Not Ready for the Post-Quantum World

Any major migration requires a delicate balance between reducing risk and minimizing operational disruptions. This is another reason NIST wants organizations to act now, since data stolen today could become readable the moment attackers gain access to sufficiently powerful quantum computing.

However, despite best efforts, a GAO report documents real-world gaps between readiness and reality, suggesting that NIST’s deadlines may be tough to meet. The US watchdog does not mince words, headlining a chapter: “Agencies Have Not Fully Implemented Preparatory Practices for Addressing Quantum Cyber Threats.”

That was the conclusion reached after analysts evaluated cryptographic inventories, funding assessments, and other planning documentation for each of the 24 agencies covered by the 1990 Chief Financial Officers Act. That constitutes all cabinet departments and independent agencies, including NASA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Social Security Administration.

And sufficient progress is unlikely. Only half of the 24 agencies fully agreed with GAO’s recommendations. The rest pushed back, hedged, or did not respond, according to the report.

Still, GAO stands by its recommendations, which, like NIST, include establishing processes to inventory vulnerable cryptography and securing funding for the shift to post-quantum cryptography.

If legacy systems cannot be migrated to address the new concerns — which is highly likely — they must plan to replace them instead, a process that could take even longer as the threat grows more dire.

Cybersecurity Shortcomings: A Case of Déjà Vu

GAO attributes the missed marks in part to a lack of cryptography expertise, noting that transitioning to post-quantum encryption requires specialized mathematical and cybersecurity skills that most agencies currently lack.

Whatever the reason, it’s essential to act quickly, the auditor urges. Until the agencies address those weaknesses, their cryptography will not be able to withstand the threat quantum computers pose to their sensitive information, GAO’s report concludes.

But forget quantum readiness — agencies aren’t even fully prepared for today’s threats, according to other GAO reports.

The agency has made over 4,400 cybersecurity recommendations, including 48 deemed a priority, since 2010. However, as of February 2026, more than 730 remain unimplemented.

“Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal and critical infrastructure IT systems will be increasingly susceptible to cyber threats,” GAO states.

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Originally published on Dark Reading